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1. Introduction 
Conmet classification has been and will continue to be one of the most com-plex issues arising from the intersection of national security policy and in-
ternationallaw. From the inception of what the United States dubbed the "Global 
War on Terror," experts have been debating the meaning of the term "armed con-
fli ct," both international and non-international. The proliferation of remotely pi-
loted warfare has only exacerbated the uncertainty associated with the meaning of 
these terms. In response, the concept of self-defense targeting emerged as an osten-
sible alternative to determining if and when a national llsear armed force qualified 
as an armed conflict. In essence, this theory averts the need to engage in jus in bello l 
classification of counterterror military operations by relying on the overarchingjus 
ad bellum2 legal justification for these operations. Self-defense targeting, or what 
Professor Kenneth Anderson has called "naked self-defense,") is offered as the U.S. 
legal fra mework for employing combat power to destroy or disrupt the capabilities 
• Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas. Previously Lieutenant Colonel, 
U.S. Army, and Special Assistant to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War Mal· 
ters. I wouJd like 10 thank Nicholas Geohegan and Joel Glover for theirexceUent contributions in 
support of completing this article. 
Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello 
of transnational terrorist operatives.4 This essay will question the validity of substi-
tutingjus ad bellutn principles for those of the jus in bello, and why this substitution 
is a false solution to this extremely complex conflict classification dilemma. 
The attack on Osama Bin Laden's (OBL) compound in PakistanS has exposed in 
stark relief the importance of defining the legal framework applicable to the use of 
military force as a counterterrorism tool. The initial focus of the public debate gen-
erated by the attack was the legitimacy of the U.S. invocation of the inherent right 
of self-defense to launch a non -consensual operation within the sovereign terri tory 
of Pakistan.6 However, that foc us soon shifted to another critical legal question: 
even assuming the exercise of national self-defense was legitimate, what law regu-
lated the tactical execution of the operationF By virtue of his role as the leader of al 
Qaeda, was OBL a lawful mili tary objective within the meaning of the law of armed 
conflict (LOAC),8 and thereby subject to attack with deadly force as a measure of 
first resort? Or was he merely an international criminal, subject to a m uch more 
limited law enforcement use of force authori ty? The duality of the jus belli issues 
implicated by the attack generated a two-pronged legal cri tique: First, did the mis-
sion violate the international legal prohibition against use of force (jus ad bellutn)? 
Second, did the mission trigger the law of armed conflict, or was the amount of 
force employed during the mission resulting in OBL's death excessive to that which 
was necessary to apprehend him? The self-defense targeting theory failed to suffi-
ciently address this duality. 
The first prong of this dualistic legal debate touches on an issue that appears 
well-settled in U.S. practice: the use of mili tary force to attack individuals who are 
determined to be al Qaeda or Taliban belligerent operatives. The second prong-
how such attacks are legally regulated at the tactical execution level-remains a 
subject of uncertainty. Both Presidents Bush and Obama (with the support of 
Congress) consistently invoked the inherent right of national self-defense pursu-
ant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations as the legal basis for attack-
ing al Qaeda operatives.9 However, the Obama administration seems to have 
superimposed an odd veneer on this authority: the concept of self-defense target-
ing. 1O Invoking the inherent right of self-defense, this theory suggests that both the 
resort to armed fo rce and the execution of specific operations are regulated by the 
jllS ad bellutn. In essence, because attacking terrorist targets falls within the scope 
of international self-defense legal authori ty, jus ad bellutn self-defense principles 
regulate the execution of combat operations used to achieve this self-defense ob-
jective, obviating the need to assess whether and what jus in bello principles apply 
to these operations. Thus, so long as the targets fall within the ad bellutn principles 
of necessity and proportionality, attacking them is legally pennissible. 
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II. Background 
There is nothing un usual about the assertion that the principles of necessity and 
proportionality regulate combat operations directed against transnational terrorist 
operatives.ll What is unusual is the assertion that jus ad bellum variants of these 
principles regulate operational execution.12 Necessity and p roportionality have 
always been core principles of both branches of the jus belli-principles that apply 
to both the authority to employ military force and the regulation of actual employ-
ment . However, in the jus ad bellum context, they have never before been viewed as 
principles to regulate operational and tactical execution. 13 Instead, in that context 
they frame the legality of national or multinational resort to military force in self-
defense. Once the decision is made to employ force pursuant to this authori ty, the 
jus in bello variant of these principles (necessity of the mission and proportionality 
of collateral damage) operate to regulate the application of combat power d uring 
mission execut ion (in other words, they provide the foundatio n fo r the regulation 
of the application of combat power in the context of the self-defense-justified 
mission). 
This self-defense targeting paradigm-Professor Kenneth Anderson's "naked 
self-defense"I~-is certainly responsive to concerns over the legality of extending 
counterterror combat operations beyond the geographic limits of Afghanistan 
(and to an increasingly lesser degree Iraq). However, it does not and cannot be-
come a substitute for defining the rules that regulate the actual execution of such 
missions. This ad bellum targeting theory may in some ways be responsive to the 
uncertainty related to the legal characterization of the struggle against transna-
tional terrorism, or perhaps more precisely the question of whether an armed con-
flict can exist within the meaning of international law when States employ armed 
force to find, fix and destroy terrorist operations in diverse geographic locations.15 
A subcomponent of this question regarding the existence of an armed conflict is, 
even assuming the answer is yes, does such a conflict follow the enemy wherever on 
the globe he may be and does it provide for a "springing" of the LOAC authority for 
brief periods of time wherever he is located? 
Since the United States initiated its military response to the terrorist attacks of 
September I I, 2001, the uncertainty related to the legal nature of this response has 
been a central theme in policy and academic discourse. Although the answers to 
these questions seem increasingly settled in U.S. practice (at least in the practical if 
not legal sense), questions over the legality of killing OBL--or the availability of 
viable al ternatives-have again highlighted the significance of this uncertainty. 
While the United States seems to have abandoned the assertion that it is in a "war" 
against terror that spans the entire globe, its continued attack of what can only be 
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understood as targets of opportunity in places like Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan 
have kept this uncertainty at the forefront of contemporary debate on counter-
terror operations. 16 
Various interpretations of what triggers the jus in bello emerged following the 
U.S. military response to the terror attacks of September II. In general terms, these 
theories ranged across a spectrum from a strict adherence to the theretofore widely 
accepted internationaVinternal armed conflict paradigm, to the other extreme, 
proffered by me and others, that military operations conducted against interna-
tional terrorist organizations like al Qaeda should be characterized as transnational 
armed confli cts: non-international armed conflicts of international scope. 17 
Within that range were included concepts such as militarized law enforcement and 
extraterritorial law enforcement (military operations within the framework ofhu-
man rights principles). All of these approaches shared a common theme: they 
sought to define the rules of tactical execution applicable to this military response 
within a framework of established legal norms. 18 
This essay will argue that the concept of self-defense targeting does not and can-
not provide a substitute for resolving the debate about in bello applicability to 
transnational counterterror military operations. The reasons for this are multifac-
eted. First, the jus ad bellum has never been understood as a source of operational 
or tactical regulation nor a substitute for the law providing that regulation.19 
Indeed, one of the central tenets of the jus belli has always been the invalidity of reli-
ance on the jus ad bellum to define jus in bello obligations. Instead, the de facto na-
ture of tactical execution is the principal factor for assessing applicability of the jus 
in bello. Second, because the jus ad bellum has never been conceived as a tactical 
regulatory framework, using it as a substitute for the jus in bello injects unaccept-
able confusion into the planning and execution of combat operations. Finally, 
while the principles of necessity and proportionality are central to both branches of 
the jus belli, the meaning of these principles is not identical in each branch but, in 
fact, disparate. As a result, the scope of lawful authority to employ force during 
mission execution will be subtly but unquestionably degraded if ad bellum princi-
ples are utilized as a substitute for in bello regulation. 
A. Transnational Armed Conflict: Genesis and Controversy 
Transnational anned conflict as a legal term of art was nonexistent prior to Sep-
tember II , 2001. Other writings provide extensive explanation of the term's origins 
and the concept it proposed.20 In essence, it was a concept intended to bridge the 
chasm between the two traditionally acknowledged-and ostensibly only-situa-
tions triggering the jus in bello: international or inter-State armed conflicts and 
non-international or internal armed conflicts.21 Adopted in the 1949 revisions to 
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the Geneva Conventions, the concept of armed conflict, and these two categories of 
armed conflict, manifested an effort to ensure a genuine de facto law-triggering 
standard.22 While this did not eliminate all uncertainty as to when the law applies, 
preventing humanitarian law avoidance through reliance on technical legal con-
cepts such as war was unquestionably the primary motive behind the adoption of 
the armed conflict law trigger. 
This was a profound development in conflict regulation. For the first time in 
history, a treaty-based legal test dictated applicability of LOAC regulation.23 Al-
though originally linked only to application of the Geneva Conventions, these trig-
gers rapidly became the standard for applicability of the entire corpus of the 
LOAC.24 An entire generation of military and international lawyers learned that 
armed conflict triggers LOAC application.2s However, they also learned that there 
were only two types of armed conflict: international and internaP6 
This dichotomy was under-inclusive from its inception. The international! 
internal armed conflict dichotomy was dearly responsive to the law avoidance 
that occurred during World War II and the law inapplicability during the Spanish 
Civil WarP However, it failed to account for the possibility of extraterritorial 
armed conflicts between States and non-State belligerents.28 Although not a com-
mon situation in the history of modern warfare, hostilities in such a context were 
not unknown.29 Nor did the armed-conflict-law trigger account for the emergence 
of other external military operations involving minimal hostilities, such as United 
Nations peacekeeping missions. JO Understanding the necessity of providing a reg-
ulatory framework for such operations, commanders and legal advisors thrust 
into these zones of uncertainty resorted to policy-based application of jus in bello 
principles, a methodology that proved generally effective in the decade preceding 
9/1 l. l1 However, this approach to ftIling the regulatory void created by the inter-
national/internal dichotomy also averted attention from the underlying issue of 
regulatory under-ind usiveness. l2 
This under-inclusiveness was fully exposed when the United States initiated its 
military response toal Qaeda following the terror attacks of September II}3 As the 
United States began to preventively detain captives in that struggle, the implicit in-
vocation of LOAC authority became clear.14 Use of the designation "unlawful 
combatant" confirmed this invocation-these terrorist operatives were detained 
not as criminals awaiting adjudication, but as enemy operatives to prevent their re-
turn to hostilities}S However, pursuant to the advice provided by his Attorney 
General, President Bush concluded that LOAC protections were inapplicable to 
these detainees.)6 The basis for this conclusion was d ear: the armed conflict with al 
Qaeda did not fit within the international/internal armed conflict law-triggering 
equation.l1 Because al Qaeda was not a State, the conflict could not qualify as 
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international; because al Qaeda operated outside the territory of the United States, 
the conflict could not qualify as internal.l8 
This determination was problematic on numerous levels, but for military 
lawyers trained to ensure compliance with LOAC principles during all military op-
erations no matter how they might be legally classified,39 it was particularly trou-
bling. As I have written previously, the concept of transnational armed conflict 
evolved to respond to this newly exploited gap in legal protections for individuals 
subjected to LOAC-based authority.40 The objectives of the concept were simple: 
adopt a characterization for the non-international anned conflict with al Qaeda 
consistent with the non-State but nonetheless international character of the orga-
nization; require application offundamental LOAC principles; and deny al Qaeda 
any credibility windfall from suggesting the conflict was international within the 
meaning of the law. In short, it was simply a term to denote a non-international 
armed conflict (within the meaning of Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions) of international scope, what others have called an "international-
ized non-international armed conflict."4l 
Reaction to the transnational armed conflict concept has ranged the spectrum 
from rejection42 to endorsement;H however, it is important to note that the un-
derlying objective is also reflected in other conceptions of the legal framework for 
the military component of counterterror operations. As noted, these include "in-
ternationalized" non-international armed conflict and militarized extraterritorial 
law enforcement.44 For the United States, this debate was essentially resolved by 
the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.45 A majority of the 
Court concluded the tenn "non-international anned conflict" in Common Arti-
cle 3 is not restricted to internal armed conflicts, but covers any armed conflict 
that does not qualify as international within the meaning of Common Article 2.46 
This "co ntradistinction" interpretation effectively achieved the transnational 
armed conflict objective: a majority of the Court closed the gap identi fied (some 
might say exploited) by the Department of Justice analysis and relied on by Presi-
dent Bush.47 By concluding that any armed conflict that fails to qualify as "inter-
national" within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions is non-international 
(irrespective of geographic scope) and therefore triggers the baseline humanitar-
ian protections of Common Article 3, the Court created a simple equation: if the 
government treats the struggle against al Qaeda as an armed conflict, it must be ei-
ther international or non-international within the meaning of the Geneva 
Conventions.48 Thus, it closed the gap in humanitarian law applicability and en-
sured that future invocations of armed conflict authority must trigger minimum 
humanitarian obligations . .f9 
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The Hamdan opinion has not, however, eliminated the uncertainty and contro-
versy over the legal characterization of military operations directed against al 
Qaeda.50 Experts continue to struggle with this question, and new theories continue 
to emerge.51 It remains indisputable, however, that characterizing the contention 
between al Qaeda and the United States as an armed conflict defies indicators tra-
ditionally applied to identify the existence of non-international armed conflicts.52 
Those most notably lacking include a sustained nature of combat operations di-
rected against al Qaeda targets outside the Afghanistan zone of combat53 (even 
loosely defined ), and the lack of continuous and concerted hostilities by al Qaeda 
against the United States.54 This lack of "intensity" and "duration" was in fact cen-
tral to the conclusion by a working group of the International Law Commission 
that counterterror operations cannot be properly characterized as armed conflicts, 
even of the non-international type.55 Following President Obama's election, ex-
pectations were high that the new administration might abandon the armed con-
flict theory altogether and revert to the international law enforcement approach to 
dealing with the transnational terrorist threat. 56 Not only were these expectations 
unfounded; the new administration opened an entirely new front in the legal char-
acterization debate.5' 
B. Self-defense Targeting: A Third Rail? 
It did not take long for the Obama administration to demonstrate that it was not 
about to abandon an armed conflict-based approach to dealing with the al Qaeda 
threat.58 To this date, the United States continues to employ combat power against 
al Qaeda operatives in locations both proximate to and far removed from ongoing 
hostilities in Afghanistan.59 These operations involve the employment of deadly 
force as a measure of first resort, an unavoidable indicator that the United States 
continues to rely on an armed conflict-based legal framework.60 The discomfort 
with such an expansive concept of armed conflict is certainly understandable. 
What is equally understandable is the pragmatic reality that the nature of these 
operations makes them inconsistent with peacetime law enforcement legal princi-
ples.61 Nonetheless, the apparent aversion to recognizing some type of "springing" 
armed conflict paradigm has produced not only opposition, but also a proposal 
for an alternative legal framework that avoids the need to address the conflict clas-
sification dilemma: self-defense targeting.62 
This alternative methodology is most notably attributed to Professor Kenneth 
Anderson.63 In a series of essays, Anderson began to proffer the argwnent that the 
jus ad bellum provides sufficient-and ostensibly exclusive-legal authority for 
the regulation of attacks directed against terrorist operatives.64 This theory has 
also been embraced by Professor Jordan Paust.65 Although Paust has consistently 
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rejected characterizing the response to transnational terrorism as an armed con-
flict66 (based primarily on a classical interpretation of Common Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions)/,7 his position has evolved to acknowledge the legiti-
mate use of military force in self-defense against external non-State threats.68 That 
response would not qualify as an armed conflict, because it could not fit within the 
traditionally understood scope of the Geneva Convention law-triggering frame-
work. Instead, the jus ad bellum right of self-defense would be the exclusive source 
of legal authority related to the response. 
Professor Anderson characterizes this theory as "naked self-defense."69 Accord-
ing to Anderson, this term characterizes the legal basis for drone strikes articulated 
by State Departmen t Legal Advisor Harold Koh: exercise of jus ad bellum self-
defense does not ipso facto trigger the jus in bello. As will be explained more fully 
be1ow, in the same essay Anderson signals a significant revision of this theory-a 
retreat motivated by his reflection on the inability to effectively define the geo-
graphic scope of a transnational non-international armed conflict. What issignifi-
cant here, however, is that the thcory itself presents a complex question: is it 
possible to employ military force pursuant to a claim of jus ad bellum national self-
defense without triggering the jus in bello? And if the answer is yes, what interna-
tional legal principles regulate the application of combat power during the execu-
tion of such operations? 
In this essay, I argue that jus ad bellum targeting-Qr naked self-defense-is a 
flawed substitute fo r embracing the al ternate (albeit controversial) conclusion that 
employing combat power in self-de fense against transnational non-State opera-
tives must be characterized as armed conflict. In support of this argument, the es-
say will expose what I believe is the implicit acknowledgment by proponents of 
self-defense targeting that these operations do indeed trigger the LOAC. I will do 
this by exploring the nature of two fundamen tal jus belli principles invoked by 
these proponents: necessity and proportionality.70 Contrasting the effect of these 
principles within the self-defense targeting framework with their effect within a jus 
in bello framework will illustrate that self-defense targeting reflects an implicit ac-
knowledgment of jus in bello applicability during operational mission execution. 
Ill. The Traditional Distinction between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello 
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the jus ad 
bellum provides sufficient authority to both justify and regulate the application of 
combat power.71 This assumption ignores an axiom of jus belli development: the 
compartmentalization of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.72 As Colonel 
G.I.A.D. Draper noted in 1971, "equal application of the Law governing the 
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conduct of armed conflicts to those illegally resorting to armed forces and those 
lawfully resorting thereto is accepted as axiomatic in modern International Law. "73 
This compartmentalization is the historic response to the practice of definingjus in 
bello obligations by reference to the jus ad bellum legality of conflict. 74 As the jus in 
bello evolved to focus on the humanitarian protection of victims of war, to include 
the armed forces themselves,75 the practice of denying LOAC applicabili ty based on 
assertions of conflict illegality became indefensible. 76 Instead, the de fac to nature of 
hostilities would dictate jus in bello applicability, and the jus ad bellum legal basis 
for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination.77 
This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention law-
triggering equation.78 Adoption of the term "armed conflict" as the primary trig-
gering consideration for jus in bello applicability was a deliberate response to the 
more formalistic jus i" bello applicability that predated the 1949 revision of the 
Geneva Conventions.19 Prior to these revisions, in bello applicability often turned 
on the existence of a state of war in the international legal sense, which in turn led 
to assertions of inapplicability as the result of assertions of unlawful aggression.SO 
Determined to prevent the denial of humanitarian regulation to situations neces-
sitating such regulation-any de facto armed conflict-the 1949 Conventions 
sought to neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81 
This effort rapidly became the norm of internationallaw.82 Armed conflict anal-
ysis simply did not include conflict legality considerations.83 National military 
manuals, international jurisprudence and expert commentary all reflect this devel-
opment. SoI This division is today a fundamental LOAC tenet-and is beyond dis-
pute.85 In fact, for many years the United States has gone even farther, extending 
application of LOAC principles beyond situations of armed conflict altogether so 
as to regulate any military operation.86 This is just another manifestation of the fact 
that States, or perhaps more importantly the armed forces that do their bidding, 
view the cause or purported justification for such operations as irrelevant when de-
ciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution. 
This aspect of ad bellumlin bello compartmentalization is not called into ques-
tion by the self-defense targeting concept.8' Nothing in the assertion that combat 
operations directed against transnational non-State belligerent groups qualifies as 
armed conflict suggests the inapplicability ofLOAC regulatory norms on the basis 
of the relative illegitimacy of al Qaeda'sefforts to inflict harm on the United States 
and other victim States (although as noted earlier, this was implicit in the original 
Bush administration approach to the war on terror).88 Instead, the self-defense tar-
geting concept reflects an odd inversion of the concern that motivated the armed 
conflict law trigger. The concept does not assert the illegitimacy of the terrorist 
cause to deny LOAC principles to operations directed against them.89 Instead, it 
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relies on the legality of the U.S. cause to dispense with the need for applying LOAC 
principles to regulate these operations.90 This might not be explicit, but it is clear 
that an exclusive focus on ad bellum principles indicates that these principles sub-
sume in bello conflict regulation norms.91 
There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the 
traditional compartmentalization between the two branches of the jus belli,92 it cre-
ates a dangerous precedent. Although there is no express resurrection of the just 
war concept ofLOAC applicability, by focusing exclusively on jus ad bellum legality 
and principles, the concept suggests the inapplicability of jus hi bello regulation as 
the result of the legality of the U.S. cause. To be clear, I believe U.S. counterterror 
operations are legally justified actions in self-defense. However, this should not be 
even implicitly relied on to deny jus in bello applicability to operations directed 
against terrorist opponents, precisely because it may be viewed as suggesting the 
invalidity of the opponent's cause deprives them of the protections of that law, or 
that the operations are somehow exempted from LOAC regulation. Second, even 
discounting this detrimental precedential effect, the conOation of ad bellum and in 
bello principles to regulate the execution of operations is extremely troubling.'B 
This is because the meaning of these principles is distinct within each branch of the 
jus beUi.'l4 
Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum princi-
ples purported1y invoked to regulate operational execution is more restrictive 
than that derived from their jus in bello counterparts,9S this conflation produces a 
potential windfall for terrorist operatives. Thus, the ad bellumJin bello conflation 
is ironically self-contradictory. In one sense, it suggests the inapplicability of jus 
in bello protections to the illegitimate terrorist enemy because of the legitimacy of 
the U.S. cause.96 In another sense, the more restrictive nature of the jus ad bellum 
principles it substitutes for the jus in bello variants to regulate operational execu-
tion provides the enemy with increased protection from attack.97 Neither of these 
consequences is beneficial, nor necessary. Instead, compliance with the tradi-
tional jus ad bellum/jus in bello compartmentalization methodology averts these 
consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict 
regulation.98 
IV. Necessity and Proportionality: The Risk of Authority Dilution 
The most problematic aspect of the self-defense targeting concept is that it pro-
duces a not so subtle substitution ofjllS ad bellum necessity and proportionality for 
the jus in bello variants of these principles.99 While these principles are fundamen-
tal in both branches of the jus belli, 100 they are not identical in effect. The ad bellum 
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variants are intended to limit State resort to force to a measure of last resort;IOI the 
in bello variants are intended to strike an appropriate balance between the author-
ity to efficiently bring about the submission of an enemy and the humanitarian in-
terest of limiting the inevitable suffering associated with armed conflict. 102 
It is a fo undational principle of international law that the jus ad bellum restricts 
resort to force by States to situations of absolute necessity-and necessity justifies 
only proportional force to return the status quo ante. 103 In this sense, national 
self-defense is strikingly analogous to individual self-defense as a criminal law 
justification. H14 In both contexts, necessity requires a determination of an immi-
nent threat of unlawful attack, a situation affording no alternative other than self-
help measures. lOS Furthennore, even when the justification of self-help is trig-
gered by an imminent threat, both bodies of law strictly limit the amount offorce 
that may be employed to respond to the threat.l06 States, like individuals, may use 
only that amount of force absolutely necessary to meet the threat and restore the 
status quo ante of security. to? Using more force than is necessary to subdue the 
threat is considered excessive, and therefore outside the realm of the legally justi-
fied response.108 
There is no question that these variants of necessity and proportionality are crit-
ical to the stability of international relations. 109 The UN Charter reflects an obvious 
judgment that States are obligated to endeavor to resolve all disputes peacefully, 
and that resort to force must be conceived as an exceptional measure. 110 A very lim-
ited conception of necessity requiring an actual and imminent threat of unlawful 
aggression selVes this purpose by prioritizing alternate dispute resolution modali-
ties over uses offorce-the core purpose of the Charter. III Even after a justifiable 
resort to fo rce, the requirement to provide notice to the Security Councll l12 reflects 
this purpose by enhancing the probability of Security Council action to restore in-
ternational peace and security and thereby nullify the necessity for continued use 
of force by the State. lu The jus ad bellum proportionality rule also selVes this pur-
pose by reducing the risk of uncontrollable escalation. 114 By limiting the justified 
response to only that amount of force absolutely necessary to reduce the threat, 
proportionality operates to mitigate the risk of a justified self-defense response 
morphing into an unjustified use of military force to achieve objectives unrelated 
to self-defense. lIS As a result, conflagration is limited, thereby enhancing the effi-
cacy of alternate dispute resolution modalities. 
These principles make perfect sense when assessing the justification for a na-
tional resort to military force outside the umbrella of a Security Council authoriza-
tion. However, as operational execution parameters, they impose a peacetime self-
defense model onto wartime employment of combat power. This is because the jus 
in bello variants of necessity and proportionality have never been understood to 
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function analogously with their peacetime variants.1I6 Instead, these principles 
have unique meaning in the context of armed conflict.117 As a result, they are sim-
ply not interchangeable with the ad bellum variants. As a result, the self-defense tar-
geting concept ostensibly regulates the execution of combat operations with norms 
inconsistent with those historically and logically suited for that purpose. 
Jus in bello necessity means something fundamentally different than self-defense 
necessity.118 In the context of armed conflict, necessity justifies a much broader ex-
ercise of authority-the authority to employ all measures not otherwise prohibited 
by international law to bring about the prompt submission of the enemy. 119 Unlike 
self-defense necessity, there is no "measure oflast resort" aspect to jus in bello ne-
cessity.12o Accordingly, armed conflict triggers authority to employ force in a 
manner that would rarely (if ever) be tolerated in peacetime, even when acting in 
self-defense.121 
The most obvious (and relevant for purposes of this essay) illustration of the dif-
ference between ad bellum and in bello necessity is the authority to employ deadly 
force against an opponent. Like peacetime self-defense, jus ad bellum self-defense 
justifies a State's use of deadly military force only as a measure oflast resort. 122 In 
contrast, jus in bello necessity authorizes the use of deadly combat power against an 
enemy as a measure of first resort. This necessity justification is implemented 
through the rule of military objective, which establishes who and what qualify as a 
lawful object of attack.123 However, once that status is determined, it is the princi-
ple of military necessity124 that justifies employment of deadly combat power 
against such "targets" as a measure of first resort. us 
It is d ear that this authority in no way requires manifestation of actual threat to 
the attacking force. 126 Instead, the status of military objective alone results in a pre-
sumption of threat that justifies the use of deadly force. 117 This preswnption itself 
indicates the unique function of in bello necessity. This central premise of the jus in 
bello was reflected as early as Rousseau's 1762 Contract social, in which he noted 
that "[wJar is not a relation between man and man, but a relation between State 
and State in which individuals are enemies only incidentally, not as men, or citi-
zens, but as soldiers."1l8 
Because armed conflict involves a contest between armed belligerent groups, 
and not merely individual actors, the use of force authority triggered by military 
necessity is focused on collective rather than individual effect. l29 In other words, 
unlike a peacetime exercise of necessity (which focuses on neutralizing an individ-
ual threat), wartimel30 necessity focuses on bringing about the submission of the 
enemy in the corporate and not individual sense.])1 This collective vice individual 
focus of justifiable violence applies at every level of military operations. At the 
strategic level, nations seek to break the will of an opponent by demonstrating to 
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enemy leadership the futility of resistance; at the operational level, commanders 
seek to impose their will on forces arrayed against them by the synchronized em-
ployment of all combat capabilities.132 The ideal outcome of such employment is 
the establishment offull-spectrum dominance, allowing the friendly commander 
to impose his will on the enemy at the time and place of his choosing. m This rou-
tinely necessitates use of overwhelming combat power at the decisive point in the 
battle--use that is often far more robust than may be required to overcome resis-
tance at that specific point. l:J4 At the tactical level, forces may use mass and shock 
to paralyze enemy forces, disrupt their ability to maneuver and adjust to the fluid-
ity of the battle, and demoralize individual unit members. us All of these effects 
contribute to " the prompt submission of the enemy."I)!; 
Employing overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time of battle 
(known as the principle of mass in the lexicon of military doctrine)l 31 would argu-
ably be inconsistent with jus ad bellum necessity.OS Instead, a commander would 
be restricted from employing any amount offorce beyond what was actually neces-
sary to subdue the individual object of attack. 139 Thus, the assertion that the jus ad 
bellum suffices to justify necessary measures to subdue an opponent misses the 
point. The question is not whether the resort to force by the State is necessary-a 
question that certainly must be answered through the lens of jus ad bellum neces-
sity.14o The question is whether the amount of force then employed by the armed 
forces of the State to subdue the enemy is justified, a question that must be an-
swered through the lens of a vel)' different conception of necessity.141 
Even more problematic than the extension of jus ad bellum necessity as an op-
erational regulatory norm is the extension of jus ad bellum proportionality. Like 
necessity, proportionality is a core principle of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in 
bello. 14 2 And like necessity, the principle has a significantly different meaning in 
each branch of the jus belli. 143 Conflating these disparate principles into a singular 
regulatol)' norm substantially degrades the scope oflawful targeting authority and 
confuses those charged with executing combat operations. 
In the jus ad bellum, proportionality really means proportionality. This might 
seem like an odd statement, but it is critical when comparing the two jus belli variants 
of the principle. Proportionality normally means no more than is absolutely nec-
essary to achieve a valid purpose. 144 It is a concept that is normally linked to a jus-
tification of necessity. 145 Similarly, under U.S. criminal law, actions in self-defense 
are invalid if executed with more force than is necessary to reduce the threat. Use 
of excessive force in that context, because not strictly necessary, is unjustified. 146 
The jus ad bellum reflects an analogous conception of proportionality .147 First, the 
amount of force a State is permitted to employ in self-defense is strictly limited 
to that amount necessary to reduce the imminent threat.148 Second, the source of 
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aggression is the beneficiary of the proportionality constraint. 149 In other words, 
as in the criminal law context, a State (like an individual) responding to unlawful 
aggression may be authorized to employ force in self-defense, but is prohibited 
from responding to the source of aggression with any amount of force in excess of 
that necessary to reduce that immediate threat. 
In contrast, proportionality in the jus in bello context does not really mean pro-
portionality. Again, this may seem like an odd proposition. Nonetheless, even a 
cursory review of the jus in hello proportionality principle validates this conclusion. 
First, unlike traditional proportionality, the jus in hello variant in no way protC<ts 
the object of deliberate violence (the lawful target). Instead, the beneficiaries of 
the protection are the knowing but non-deliberate victims of a deliberate attack-
civilians and civilian property in proximity to the lawful target. lSO Protecting these 
potential victims from what is referred to in colloquial terms as collateral damage 
and incidental injury reflects a fundamentally different purpose for this propor-
tionality constraint. Unlike in the self-defense context, jus in bello proportionality 
is not directly linked to the necessity of subduing an imminent threat. Instead, the 
objective of the principle is to protect innocent people and property in the vicinity 
of a lawful object of attack from the consequences of employing combat power 
against lawful targets. As for the lawful target itself, the suggestion that an attack 
might be disproportionate is a legal oxymoron; the status alone justifies that 
amount of force determined necessary to bring about enemy submission, which 
justifies use of deadly force as a measure of first resort. 151 The only limitation on 
that use of force is the prohibition against the use of methods (tactics) or means 
(weapons ) calculated or of a nature to cause superfl uous injury or unnecessary 
suffering. However, this rule is not synonymous with the protections provided by 
the principle of proportionality, and rarely is considered a limitation on the em-
ployment of authorized weapon systems against enemy personnel, facilities or 
equipment. 
Second, beneficiaries of jus in bello proportionality (potential victims of collat-
eral damage and incidental injury) are not protected from disproportionate effects, 
but from excessive effects. IS! An attack is unlawful within the meaning of jus in 
bello proportionality only when the knowing but non-deliberate harm will be ex-
cessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. While the principle, like its 
ad bellum counterpart, does trigger a balance of interests, the fulcrum upon which 
that balance is made is fundamentally different. Excessive is not, nor ever has been, 
analogous to disproportionate. ls3 To begin with, the meaning of the word is far 
more elusive than that of traditional proportionality. Proportionality connotes 
something slightly more than necessary to produce an outcome. While this is not a 
precise concept, it lends itself to objective evaluation. Indeed, juries sitting in 
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judgment of defendants claiming the justifi cation of self-defense routinely critique 
the amount of force employed by the defendant, asking whether it was more than 
necessary to respond to the threat. 
Excessive, in contrast, connotes a significant imbalance. While the precise 
meaning of excessive collateral damage or incidental injury remains nearly as elusive 
today as it was when the concept was incorporated into Additional Protocol I, ISo! one 
thing is dear: it is not analogous to disproportionate harm as the term is used in re-
lation to traditional proportionality analysis. Instead, it means something more 
analogous to harm so overwhelming that it actually nullifies the legitimacy of at-
tacking an othernrise lawful target. Thus, the jus in bello proportionality principle 
does not obligate commanders to strictly limit the amount of fo rce employed 
against a lawful target to the absolute minimum necessary to eliminate a threat. 
Instead, it obligates the commander to cancel an attack only when the anticipated 
harm to civilians andJor civilian property is so beyond the realm of reason that in-
fli cting that harm, even incidentally, reflects a total disregard fo r the innocent vic-
tims of hostilities. ISS In this sense, it is almost as if the law imputes an illicit state of 
mind to a commander because of the disregard of the risk of overwhelming harm 
to the civilian population.lS6 
This jus in bello variant of proportionality is further distinguished from its ad 
bellum counterpart because of the nature of operational and tactical targeting. In a 
traditional self-defense context, the employment of force (individually or nation-
ally) is justified for the sole purpose of eliminating the imminent threat. In armed 
conflict, the potential effect to be achieved by employing combat power against a 
lawful target often varies depending on mission requirements. Accordingly, elimi-
nation of an individual threat is not the unitary objective offorce employment. In-
stead, commanders leverage their combat power to achieve defined effects against 
the range of enemy targets in the battlespace, effects that collectively facilitate enemy 
submission.ls7 Destruction is obviously one of these effects. However, doctrinal ef-
fects also include disruption, degradation, interdiction, suppression and harass-
ment.lss Each of these effects requires a different type and amount of fo rce to 
achieve; and each effect therefore implicates a very different proportionality 
analysis. 
This variable nature of justifiable effects in anned conflict-known in opera-
tional terms as "effects-based operations"159-is a critical factor in applying the jus 
in bello proportionality principle, and finds no analogue in self-defense targeting. 
Nations employ force to reduce the threat, and only that amount offorce required 
to do so is justified . Accordingly, if disruption alone is sufficient to restore the non-
threat environment, the jus ad bellum obligates the State to employ force limited in 
intensity to achieve this effect. However, no analogous minimum necessary force 
71 
Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello 
obligation exists pursuant to the jus in bello proportionality principle. Instead, each 
employment of force is operationally connected to the broader overall objective of 
compelling enemy submission. Thus, disruption and bypass of enemy fo rces may 
be a selected course of action at one point in the battle, while total destruction may 
be selected for a similar enemy force at another point in the battle. Obviously, these 
different selected effects will drive the amount of force employment required, 
which will in turn influence the risk of collateral damage and incidental injUll'. 
Furthermore, under the ad bellum construct, proportionality is traditionally as-
sessed at the strategic (macro) level. 160 
The importance of this aspect of jus in bello proportionality is reflected in the 
requirement that the consequences of force employment be assessed against the 
overall operational objective, and not the individual tactical objective. A number of 
States included this macro conception of proportionality in understandings when 
they ratified Additional Protocol I. 161 The motivation to enter such reservations 
seems obvious: attribution of the value of employing combat power in armed con-
flict for purposes of balancing the anticipated effects of that employment against 
collateral damage and incidental injury must be framed by the broader concept of 
how it contributes to the legitimate operational objective of compelling enemy 
submission, not through a micro assessment of whether it is sufficient to achieve 
any given and isolated tactical objective. This aspect of jus in bello proportionality 
once again reflects the most fundamental difference between the two variants of 
the principle: the beneficiary of the protection is not the object of attack. 
Collectively, all of these considerations indicate that extending jus ad bellum 
proportionality to jus in bello decision making produces at worst a significant dis-
tortion oflegitimate operational authority, and at best confusion as to the scope of 
targeting authority. Are forces executing jus ad bellum self-defense missions obli-
gated to employ minim um force to subdue the object of attack? Is the object of at-
tack protected by the principle? Must proportionality be assessed based on an 
exclusive consideration of reducing the threat presented by the immediate object 
of attack, or may the broader impact on enemy fo rces be considered? These ques-
tions are nullified by maintaining the traditional division between jus ad bellum 
authority and jus in bello regulation. Pursuant to this division, the nation acts in re-
sponse to an actual or imminent threat and the armed forces executing operations 
pursuant to that justificatiml employ force in order to bring about the prompt sub-
mission of the enemy entity posing the threat. In so doing, they balance the risk of 
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and civilian property in the vi-
cinity of enemy objects of attack. But nothing obligates them to employ the mini-
mum amount of force to achieve each individual tactical objective. 
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v. If It Ain' t Broke Don't Fix It: Jus in Bello Principles and Tactical Clarity 
As noted earlier in this essay, some commentators continue to assert the inapplica-
bility of jus in bello principles to the struggle against transnational terrorism on the 
basis that this struggle cannot qualify as armed conflict, or that if it does it is geo-
graphically restricted to zones of traditional combat operations.162 Some of these 
commentators also reject the legitimacy of invoking jus ad bellum self-defense to 
attack terrorists. This rejection at least renders their position logically consistent. 
The same cannot be said for advocates of self-defense targeting: those who assert 
the legitimacy ofinvoking the right of national self-defense to respond to the threat 
of transnational terrorism, but insist such operations cannot normally qualify as 
armed conflicts triggering the jus in bello. 163 If, as they assert, responding to terror-
ism with military force is justified pursuant to the jus ad bellum, then the use of 
combat capability to execute such missions is, in the view of this author and others, 
sufficient to qualify as armed conflict. Why is there such aversion to acknowledging 
jus in bello applicability to military operations executed to achieve these legitimate 
self-defense objectives? The most obvious answer appears to be the conclusion that 
these operations, while justified as actions in self-defense, fail to satisfy the interna-
tionally accepted elements to qualify as armed conflicts. l64 
This self-defense-without-armed-conflict approach reflects a visceral discom-
fort with the suggestion that States may properly invoke jus in bello authority 
whenever they choose to employ combat power abroad. Transnational armed con-
flict opponents argue that since the inception of the "Global War on Terror,» un-
less combat operations fit within the traditional Geneva Convention internationaV 
internal armed conflict equation, they cannot be characterized as armed conllicts.16S 
Others (including the author) have responded to this argument at length in previ-
ous articles. 166 However, what is perplexing is that this argument loses all merit 
when connected with the self-defense targeting theory. That theory presupposes 
the use of combat power to defend the nation against an imminent and ongoing 
threat posed by transnational terrorist operatives. 
If this is the basis for refusing to acknowledge the applicab ility of jus in bello 
regulatio n, it is the ultimate manifestation of willful blindness. Essentially, self-
defense targeting proponents implicitly acknowledge operations conducted under 
this authority involve anned hostilities against transnational non-State threats. 
However, they then avoid assessing the nature of these hostili ties, and how they 
implicate jus in bello applicability, by substituting ad bellum principles to provide a 
regulatory framework for operational execution.167 
Professor Kenneth Anderson's latest essay on this subject is particularly insight-
ful on the validity of the self-defense targeting concept. l68 An (or perhaps the) 
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original proponent of self-defense targeting,l69 Anderson candidly acknowledges 
his reversal on this issue, and that what he calls "naked self-defense" is insufficient 
to provide comprehensive regulation to transnational counterterroroperations. 170 
This is an important step in the right direction, for it will better focus debate on the 
underlying and critical question of whether a nation's resort to force in self-defense 
against an external non-State opponent can qualify as something other than armed 
conflict. My response to this question has been consistent: when a State employs 
combat power in a manner that indicates it has implicitly invoked LOAC principles 
(by employing deadly force as a measure of first resort), it is engaged in an armed 
conflict. As a reswt, it is bound to comply with core LOAC principles. 111 This does 
not mean that any use of armed forces qualifies as armed conflict. Such a view 
would certainly be overbroad, and I have argued against this approach consistently 
in the past. However, when armed forces employed to achieve a national securi ty 
objective conduct operations pursuant to LOAC-based targeting authority-status-
based targeting-that combination of armed forces and engagement authority in-
dicates they are utilizing the " tools" of war, and must respect, at a minimum, the 
core principles of the "rwes" of war. 172 
Irrespective of the relative support for or opposition to this interpretation of 
LOAC applicability, it remains a critical question that has been obscured by the 
self-defense targeting alternative. If, as propo nents like Professor Paust argue, an 
exercise of national self-defense against transnational non-State threats is not 
armed conflict, focus must be redirected to determine the alternative controlling 
legal framework for regwating the execution of such operations. Can national self-
defense be executed with an employment of military (or paramilitary) force falling 
below the threshold of armed conflict? For example, are there situations where a 
State when asserting the right of national self-defense is obligated by the jus ad bellum 
proportionality requirement to rely on police powers instead of combat power? 
This seems a particularly critical question in an era of transnational non-State 
threats. Terrorism is obviously first on that list (at least for the United States), but 
organized criminal syndicates operating across national boundaries, piracy and 
non-State-generated cyber threats all share similarities with transnational terror-
ism. All of these threats challenge the national securi ty of multiple States; all of 
these threats emanate from enti ties that are rarely organized in traditional military 
character; all of these threats may compe1 reliance on military force in response. 
Yet in the view of many, the lack of organization, territorial control and concerted 
military-type operations by these threats exclude responses (even with military 
force ) from the category of armed conflict. m 
Invoking the jus ad bellum as a justification to respond to such threats is insuffi-
cient to resolve this important question. Instead, resolving this question requires a 
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careful assessment of the nature of the threat, the nature of the requisite response 
and the very real consequences of subjecting operational execution to either a law 
enforcement or armed conflict legal framework. Some experts (the author in-
cluded) continue to believe that LOAC principles provide an effective and opera-
tionally logical framework to regulate any combat operation. But as noted above, 
this view is based on the conclusion that the key trigger for application of these 
principles is a use of force that reflects reliance on the principle of military objec-
tive. In those situations, there is arguably no value-and indeed substantial risk-
in attempting to substitute jus ad bellum principles to regulate operational execu-
tion. However, there are plausible arguments that the nature of some self-defense 
missions might justify a more restrictive operational framework based on a hybrid 
of LOAC and law enforcement principles.17~ What seems clear, however, is that 
even if true, these principles would be applied as the result of the nature of the 
threat/response continuum, not as an extension of jus ad bellum principles to regu-
late operational execution. 
VI. One Step Forward, One Step Back: A re We Missing Something? 
The statement by Legal Advisor Koh following the Bin Laden raid addressing U.S. 
legal authority for the mission and for killing Bin Laden is perhaps as clear an artic-
ulation of a legal basis for a military action ever provided by the Department of 
State. 17S Indeed, the fact that Koh articulated an official U.S. interpretation of both 
the jus ad bellum and jus in bello makes his use of a website titled Opinio /uris 176 es-
pecially significant (as such a statement by a government official in Koh's position 
is clear evidence of opinio juris). Unlike his earlier statement at a meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, m Koh did not restrict his invocation of 
law to the jus ad bellum. Instead, he asserted the U.S. position that the mission was 
justified pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense, but also that Bin Laden's 
killing was lawful pursuant to the jus in bello. Koh properly noted that as a mission 
executed in the context of the armed conflict with al Qaeda, the LOAC imposed no 
obligation on U.S. fo rces to employ minimum necessary force. Instead, Bin 
Laden's status as an enemy belligerent justified the use of deadly force as a measure 
of first resort, and Bin Laden bore the burden of manifesting his surrender in order 
to terminate that authority. Hence, U.S. forces were in no way obligated to attempt 
to capture Bin Laden before resorting to deadly forceYs 
A recent statement made by lohn Brennan, Deputy National Securi ty Advisor 
for Homeland Securi ty and Counterterrorism, further clarifies the current admin-
istration's justification for using deadly fo rce as a first resort against al Qaeda 
operatives: 
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The United States does not view our authority to use military fo rce against al-Qa'ida as 
being restricted solely to ~hot" battlefields like Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in 
an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the United States takes the legal position that . . . we 
have the authority to take action against al-Qa'ida and its associated forces without do-
ing a separate self-defense analysis each time .... 
This Administration's counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are 
focused on those individuals who are a threat to the United States, whose removal 
would cause a significant--even if only temporary--disruption of the plans and capa-
bilities of al-Qa'ida and its associated fo rces. Practically speaking, then, the question 
turns principally on how you defme "imminence." 
We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more 
flexible understanding of~imminence" may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist 
groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in 
the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts . . . . Over time, an in-
creasing number of our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recog-
nize that the traditional conception of what constitutes an "imminent" attack should 
be broadened in light of the modem-day capabilities, techniques, and technological in-
novations of terrorist organizations. l79 
These two articulations of the Obama administration's interpretation of intem a-
tionallaw reflect an important evolution of the U.S. legal framework for mili tary 
operat ions directed against transnational terrorist operatives. They leave virtually 
no doubt that the United States has embraced the concept oftransnational armed 
conflict, that the nation is engaged in an armed conflict against al Qaeda, that this 
armed conflict is non-international within the meaning of the jus in bello and that it 
transcends national borders. There is also no doubt that the United States invoked 
the jus in bello as the framework to regulate execution of the Bin Laden mission. 
Koh's clear emphasis on the in bello variants of the principles of distinction and 
proportionality cannot be read as meaning anything else. 
Koh, however, included one qualifier that suggests possible uncertainty. Reject-
ing the cr iticism that attacks such as that on Bin Laden are unlawful extrajudicial 
killings, Koh noted that "a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legiti-
mate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the 
state may use lethal force."I80What is perplexing is the "or" in the statement. Koh 
preserved a division between armed conflict and other actions in legitimate self-
defense. It is significant that he asserts the right to kill as a measure of firs t resort in 
either context (which seems to rebut any inference that he is suggesting some ac-
tions in self-defense must be exercised pursuant to a law enforcement legal 
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framework). Why was that "or" necessary? What was Koh suggesting if he was not 
suggesting a law enforcement limitation to some actions in self-defense? 
One possible answer is that Advisor Koh is simply preserving the authority of 
the United States to act in limited self-defense against an imminent terrorist threat 
that is not considered associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban. In such situations, 
the attack would accordingly be unrelated to the existing armed conflict the United 
States asserts is ongoing with these enemies. If this was the meaning of his use of the 
"or," it produces little confusion: imminent terrorist threats to the United States 
may justify military action as an exercise of jus ad bellum self-defense, and usc of 
force for such a purpose triggers LOAC applicability. However, distinguishing 
armed conflict from self-defense with an "or" could also be interpreted as an en-
dorsement of self-defense targeting, suggesting that uses of military force are regu-
lated by the jus in bello or jus ad bellum principles. This is an unnecessary 
dichotomy, and hopefully one that Advisor Koh did not intend. There is no viable 
reason to attempt to establish such a distinction; as discussed in this essay, the sug-
gestion that ad bellum principles are interchangeable with their in bello variants is 
flawed and operationally confusing. 181 
VII. Conclusion 
Transnational non-State threats are not going away any time soon. Indeed, it is 
likely that identifying a rational and credible legal basis for national response to 
such threats will continue to vex policymakers and legal advisors in the coming years. 
These threats will almost certainly lead States to continue to invoke the inherent 
right of national andior collective self-defense to justify extraterritorial responses. 
This legal basis is not, however, an adequate substitute for defining the legal frame-
work to regulate the operational exercise of this self-defense authority. Nonethe-
less, the advent ofthe self-defense targeting theory purports to be just that. 
The jus ad bellum was never conceived as a legal framework to regulate the exe-
cution of military operations. Instead, it is analogous to the law that permits indi-
viduals to act in self-defense when faced with an imminent threat of death or 
grievous bodily harm. Like the domestic self-defense concept, jus ad bellum self-
defense reflects a necessity foundation based on minimizing situations where 
States resort to force and limiting the risk of conflagration resulting from such re-
sort. Self-defense, as a form of self-help, is intended to be a measure of last resort, 
and the jus ad bellum principles of necessity and proportionality reflect that foun-
dation. In contrast, the jus in bello variants of these two principles are based on a 
fundamentally different foundation: facilitating the prom pt submission of opera-
tional opponents in the collective-not individual-sense. Accordingly, the scope 
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of permissible violence justified by the jus in bello is fundamentally different from 
that tolerated through the exercise of peacetime self-defense. 
Attempting to substitute jus ad bellum principles fo r their jus in bello variants 
is not only confusing; it fundamentally degrades target engagement authority. 
As discussed in this essay, this degradation is the result of imposing peacetime 
concepts on wartime operations. It may be conceivable that some actions in self-
defense--especiaUy in response to non-State threats-may permit only a law 
enforcement-type response. For example, if members of Mexican drug cartels be-
gan engaging in violence on the U.S. side of the border requiring, in the judgment 
of the President, some action to neutralize this threat, armed forces might be used 
to augment law enforcement officers during a mission to capture cartel members 
for subsequent trial. In such a situation, the use of armed force might be subject 
to law enforcement-type use of force authority. However, even if such situations 
are conceptually lodged within the scope of national self-defense authority, this 
cannot justify the wholesale abandonment of jus in bello principles. Instead, the na-
ture of the threat and the authority invoked by the State to respond to that threat 
must dictate the existence of armed conflict. When States utilize armed forces and 
grant them the authority to engage opponents pursuant to the LOAC rule of mili-
tary objective-an invocation revealed by the employment of deadly force as a 
measure of first resort-it indicates the existence of an armed conflict. It is the jus 
in bello, and not the jus ad bellum, that must regulate such operations. 
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mizes suffering and damage); Department of the Air Force, APP 110-31, International Law-
The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations 1-5-1-6 (1976) [hereinafter AFP 11O-31 [ 
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148. ld. 
149. Id. 
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TIES UNDE.R THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFUcr 119-25 (2004). 
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ploying indirect fire asselS serves the purpose of not only target destruction, but also disrup-
tion, harassment, and degradation"). 
159. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-60, Joint Targeting 1-8 (2007), available at http:// 
www.bilS.de/NRANEU/othersljp-dortrine/jp3_60(07).pdf. 
160. While the Oil Platforms decision, supra note 19, by the International Court of Justice 
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tile Treatment and Interrogation of lJ£tainees: Unlawful mId Unworkable, 48 WASHBURN LAW 
JOURNAL 325, 331 (2009) (asserting terrorism and armed conflict are two separate things, gov-
erned by their own selS of laws); Rona, supra note 53, al 64-65 (stating American targeting of 
terrorists in Yemen in 2002 was not part of an armed conflict between the United States and 
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163. See Paust, supra note 62, at 251-52 (supporting the United States' use of force in 
self-defense outside its own territory even oulSide the existence of a ~reJevant international or 
non-international armed conflicl ~) . 
164. See generally Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, supra note 53, at 10-18 
(adopting a definition of armed conflict that requi res satisfaction ofooth organization and in-
tensity of hostilities elements). 
165. Rona. supra note 53, at 60-65 (analyzing the trailS of armed conflict and finding they 
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011 Terror, 36 CASE WESTERN REsERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 349, 352-57 (2004) 
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(arguing against a global war on terror because it does not meet traditional Geneva ideas of 
armed conflict). 
166. See gelrerally Corn, supra note 20; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 20; see also Blank & 
Farley, supra note 121. See generally Balendra, supra note 42 (the entire article discussing what 
constitutes an armed conflict). 
167. See Paust, supra note 62. at 258-60 (stating the United States does not need to be at war 
wi th, or involved in an armed conflict with, al Qaeda to use force in self-defense, that use of 
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685,692-701 (2012). 
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LOAC principles. It is suggested that the nature of the use of force authority granted to the 
forces to execute the mission is a key indicator of the line between armed conflict and other 
uses of mili tary force fall ing below that threshold. In so doing, the authors categorically reject 
the suggestion that any use of armed force abroad triggers LOAC applicability. Instead, analysis 
of the nature of the mission and the scope of authority employed wil l drive this determination. 
The authors recognize this is not a talisman; however, they believe that this approach provides a 
more operationally realistic method of assessing when compliance with humanitarian con-
strain ts is legally obligatory than the elements approach. 
173. See generally Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, supra note 53. 
174. See, e.g., Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 7691 
02, Judgment (Dec. 13, 20(6). 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIAL<; 373 (2007), available at 
hup:llelyonl.court.gov.iIIfi1es3ngl02/690/OO7/a34/02007690.a34.pdf. In this case, which con-
cerned the legality of targeted killings, the Israel High Court of Justice ultimately decided that it 
cannot be determined in advance that every targeted killing is prohibited according to custom-
ary international law, but it also cannot be determined in advance tha t every targeted killing is 
lawful under customary international law. Each circumstance must be examined on a case-by-
case basis. 
175. Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of tire u.s. Operations Against Osama bin lAden, 
OPINIO JURIS (May 19,2011). http://opiniojuris.orgl201l/05/19Ithe-lawfulness-of-the-us 
-operation-against-osama-bin-ladenl (U[BJin laden continued to pose an imminent threat to 
the United States that engaged our right to use force, a threat that materials seized during the 
raid have only further documented. Under these circumstances, there is no question that he 
presented a lawful target for the use oflethal force." ). 
176. Id. 
177. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.$. Department of$tate, Remarks at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administralion and Inter-
national law (Mar. 25, 2010), hnp:llwww.state.gov/sll/releaseslremarksI139119.htm. 
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178. Koh, supra note 175 CThe laws of armed confl ict require acceptance of a genuine of· 
fer of surrender mat is clearly communicated by me surrendering party and received by me op· 
posing force, u nder circumstances where it is feasible for the opposing force to acceptlhat offer 
of surrender. But where that is not m e case, those laws aumorize use of lethal force against an 
enemy belligerent, under the circumstances presented here."). 
179. Brennan, supra note 9. 
180. Koh, supra note 177. 
181. One possible explanation is mat Koh may be hinting at a consideration generally over· 
looked. The fact mat the Director of Central Intelligence (and not me Commander of U.S. Spe· 
cial Operations Command) directed me Bin Laden mission is one of me most interesting 
aspects of the publicly disclosed information about the mission. Concerning m e prior wide· 
sp read reference to a Central In telligence Agency (CtA) drone operations program, see, e.g., 
David S. Cloud, CIA Drones Have a Widened Focus across Pakistan: Since 2008, the Agemy Has 
Been Allowed to Kill Unnamed Suspects, PITISBURGH POST-GAZEITE, May 9, 2010, at A6. See 
also Associated Press, Suspected US Drone Strike Kills 20 in Pakistani Tribal Area, Say Intel Offi-
cials, WATERLOO CHRONICLE, Jan. 17,2010, at I; Ken Dilanian, CIA Dronesloining Fight Inside 
Yemen, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 15, 2011, at 18. This revelation was not particularly remark· 
able. However, like me drone program itself, it does raise serious questions related to the legal. 
ity of employing civilian intelligence personnel to execute missions under me rubric of jus ad 
bellum self· defense. See Mary O'Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Ter-
ror, 35 CASE WI'SfERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 325, 327-38 (2003) (dis· 
cussing me legali ty of CtA operatives using drones to kil l suspected al Qaeda operatives in 
Yemen); Dave Glazier, Playing by tire Rules: Combating al Qaeda Witllin tire Law of War, 51 
WILLIAM AND MARY LAw REVIEW 957, 958 (2009) (stating under certain conditions the m ili· 
tary-but not the CtA-<an legally kill or detain suspected terrorists under the law of war); 
Gary Solis, America's Own Unlawful Combatants, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 12,2010, at AI7 
(citing the illegality of the CIA's use of drones to kill members of al Qaeda) . Perhaps mat Hor" is 
a reference to some type of legal division that exists between self-defense operations executed 
by the armed forces and those executed by the CIA. Is Koh's statement part of an effort to shield 
the use of CtA operatives from me "lawful bell igerent" requirement of the jus in bello, and to 
suggest that CIA operations, while justified pursuan t to me jus ad bellum, are technically not 
part of the armed conflict with al Qaeda~ 
If th is is the genesis ofKoh's ~or," it should be explici tly acknowledged and he should articu· 
late the legal theory for the use of deadly force outside the context of armed conflict. The relative 
merits of such a meory are well beyond the scope of th is essay. However, it is interesting to con· 
sider how the U.S. view of war crimes liabil ity for unprivileged belligerents may be influ encing 
th is apparent attempt to p reserve some jus ad bellllm targeting carved o ut from jus in bello appli. 
cability. 1t is well known that one of the most contentious offenses in the Military Commission 
Act of 2006 (as amended) is murder in violation of the law of war. &e 10 U.S.c. § 950(t)( 15) 
(2009) (HMurder in violation of the lawof war. Anyperson subject to mischapterwho intention· 
ally kills one or more persons, including privileged belligerents, in violation of the law of war 
shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a m il itary commission under mis chap. 
ter may direct."). 
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